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BANKRUPTCY - THE DEFALCATION EXCEPTION TO DIS­
CHARGE: SHOULD A FIDUCIARY'S MISTAKE PROHIBIT A DIS­
CHARGE FROM DEBT? 
INTRODUCTION 
The Bankruptcy Code1 allows debtors to be discharged2 from 
financial obligations when they become too burdensome, but it also 
provides a number of special exemptions3 to ensure that this relief 
is afforded to the "honest but unfortunate debtor."4 One exemp­
tion, 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(4), the focus of this Note, states that an 
individual's debt will not be discharged for "defalcation while act­
ing in a fiduciary capacity."5 This exemption has been at the root of 
much judicial debate because courts disagree as to whether a fiduci­
ary must have intent to commit defalcation.6 For the debtor, the 
difference between a standard of defalcation requiring intent and 
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) and 
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 
Stat. 33 (1984) (codified as amended at 11 u.s.c. §§ 101-133Q (2004)). 
2. Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Determining Congressional Intent Regarding Dis­
chargeability of Imputed Fraud Debts in Bankruptcy, 54 MERCER L. REV. 987, 987-88 
(2003) ("In exchange for participating ... in this orderly distribution of one's assets, a 
debtor is given the ability to nullify all debts remaining after the distribution concludes, 
known as a discharge."). 
3. 11 U.S.c. § 523(a) (2004) (providing for nineteen exceptions to discharge in­
cluding those for fraudulently filed taxes, false pretenses used to obtain credit, monies 
owed for child support or alimony, money owed for willful or malicious injury to person 
or property of another, etc.). See also Andrew Kessler, Exceptions to Discharge: The 
Supreme Court Adopts A Preponderance of the Evidence Standard of Proof in Section 
523 Proceedings, 15 NOVA L. REV. 1411, 1412 (1991). 
4. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991). See also Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 
292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (Bankruptcy "gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor ... a 
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort. "). 
5. § 523(a) ("A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of 
this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt ... (4) for fraud or 
defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny."). 
6. See In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2002) ("The present range of interpre­
tations of 'defalcation' among the circuits, [extends] from innocent mistake to a civil 
recklessness."); see also Meyer v. Rigdon, 36 F.3d 1375, 1383 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[C]ourts 
have split over the question of whether mere negligent acts may be 'defalcations."'); 
Reinhardt & Horlbeck, infra note 8, at 1774. 
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one in which no intent is required is crucial. If no intent to commit 
defalcation is necessary, then a debt created as a result of the fiduci­
ary's mistake or negligence could be denied discharge. On the 
other hand, if a creditor is forced to prove that the debtor intended 
to commit a defalcation, there is a much higher standard for the 
creditor to meet and more debts of the fiduciary would be 
discharged. 
The absence of a definition of "defalcation" in the Bankruptcy 
Code7 has led to the popularity of the § 523(a)(4) exception 
amongst creditors seeking to prevent a debtor from obtaining dis­
charge, since it typically encompasses a vast array of conduct and 
because a majority of courts have held that intent is not required.s 
As a result, fiduciaries who cannot account for entrusted funds have 
often been denied discharge for the debt in bankruptcy proceedings 
for committing "defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity."9 
Even innocent mistakes in accounting can prevent a fiduciary from 
receiving a discharge. lO This Note, prompted by a recent First Cir­
cuit case, addresses whether this lack-of-intent standard is appropri­
ate to apply in § 523(a)(4) proceedings.ll 
The current broad reach of § 523(a)(4) has given the courts the 
difficult task of having to dissect a variety of factual circumstances 
and, without a definition of "defalcation," determine whether a de­
falcation was committed. Consider this simple example where an 
attorney who is the trustee for a client's trust is holding $100,000 on 
behalf of the trust. The trustee deposits the funds in a bank, which 
appears on all accounts to be federally insured, but later goes bank­
rupt and in fact, the bank was misrepresenting itself as federally 
insured when it was not. After the trust wins a judgment against 
the trustee, that trustee files for bankruptcy. Should the trustee be 
denied discharge for committing defalcation while acting in a fiduci­
ary capacity? What if the trustee deposits money in a bank which 
does not advertise itself to be federally insured and this institution 
7. See, e.g., In re Twitchell, 72 B.R. 431, 434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1987) ("The term 
'defalcation' ... does not have a precise definition and no legislative history or com­
ment exists to aid the interpretation. "). 
8. Peter M. Reinhardt & William G. Horlbeck, Defalcation While Acting in a Fi­
duciary Capacity: What Does it Mean?, 79 COLO. LAW. 1773, 1773 (1995). 
9. Id. ("Creditors often prefer to assert the defalcation in a fiduciary capacity 
exception because the term 'defalcation' has consistently been interpreted to encom­
pass a wider spectrum of conduct ...."). 
10. In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 2001); In re Cochrane, 124 F.3d 
978, 984 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Lewis, 97 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 1996). 
11. Baylis, 313 F.3d at 17. 
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goes bankrupt as well? Consider instead, that the trustee invests 
the money in his own start-up company as a temporary loan, which 
later fails and as a result the $100,000 is lost. Finally, imagine the 
trustee takes the money outright, buys a vacation home, and refuses 
to refund the trust funds. Courts must examine facts like these, 
which will be revisited later, and determine in which, if any, of these 
situations the trustee has committed defalcation that would prevent 
a discharge under § 523(a)(4). 
Adding to the confusion is the tension between the conflicting 
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code: a fresh start for the "honest but 
unfortunate debtor"12 versus repayment to similarly situated credi­
tors.13 Those courts that favor a standard requiring a lower level of 
intent (thereby making discharge more difficult for the debtor while 
providing easier collection for creditors) agree that the need to hold 
fiduciaries accountable in their special legal roles outweighs the de­
sire for a fresh start policy.14 These courts maintain that one who 
commits a defalcation while in a fiduciary capacity should not be 
considered an "honest but unfortunate debtor" and that "the requi­
site 'badness' ... is supplied by an individual's special legal status 
with respect to another ...."15 On the other hand, the courts that 
require some sort of wrongful intent on behalf of the debtor hold 
the fresh start policy in very high regard and strictly construe excep­
tions in favor of the debtor.16 These divergent approaches to policy 
priorities have culminated in the current split among the circuit 
courts over the question of whether defalcation under § 523(a)(4) 
requires intent. While the circuit split is of considerable modern­
day significance, its origins date back to the earlier part of the 20th 
century. 
The Second Circuit, in the 1937 decision in Central Hanover 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, first raised the possibility that an inno­
cent default may be all that is required to constitute defalcation by 
12. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991); Mark S. Summers, The Exception 
to Discharge in Bankruptcy for Defalcation by a Fiduciary, 92 COM. L.J. 314, 315 (1987). 
13. Summers, supra note 12, at 314. Further, the conflict between that fresh start 
policy and the continuingly expanding list of exceptions seemingly provides even less 
optimism for reconciliation between these two policies. Compare 11 U.S.c. § 523(a) 
(1988) with 11 U.S.c. § 523(a) (2003) (In 1988, there were ten exceptions to discharge; 
today there are nineteen.). 
14. In re Johnson, 691 F.2d 249, 256 (6th Cir. 1982). 
15. /d. 
16. Meyer v. Rigdon, 36 F.3d 1375, 1385 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[E]xceptions to dis­
charge are strictly construed against the objecting creditor and in favor of the debtor.") 
(citation omitted). 
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suggesting that defalcation may include innocent defaults.17 Since, 
courts have split on what standard, or level, of intent should be used 
to determine whether a fiduciary has committed a defalcation pur­
suant to § 523(a)(4).18 The camps of interpretation have variously 
held that an innocent mistake, negligence, or recklessness consti­
tutes defalcation.19 The Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits read the 
open-ended question in Central Hanover in its broadest sense so 
that a minute mistake will make a fiduciary's debts non-discharge a­
ble.20 The Tenth Circuit has rested with the notion that negligence 
on the part of a fiduciary will constitute defalcation.21 Thus, four 
circuits, the Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth, do not require any 
specific intent or motive on behalf of the debtor. 
In contrast, three circuits require intent. The Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits each require a standard similar to recklessness, that of will­
ful neglect.22 The First Circuit was confronted with this issue for 
the first time in 200223 and held that "defalcation requires some 
degree of fault, closer to fraud, without the necessity of meeting a 
strict specific intent requirement. "24 
This Note examines the issue central to this circuit split: 
whether defalcation under § 523(a)(4) requires intent on the part of 
the debtor in order for a debt to be denied discharge. Part I of this 
Note will give a background of the Bankruptcy Code, a history of 
the evolution of its envisioned purposes and an introduction to dis­
charge and defalcation. Part II will introduce the principal cases 
throughout the circuits that have split on this issue. Part III will 
17. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 511 (2d Cir. 1937) 
("'[D]efa1cation,' ordinarily implies some moral dereliction, but in this context it may 
have included innocent defaults ...."). But see infra note 97 and accompanying text 
(the wording "in this context" seems to be directed toward the introductory use of 
"defalcation" which was as a definition rather than as an exception). 
18. In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2002); In re Storie, 216 B.R. 283, 287 
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997). 
19. Baylis, 313 F.3d at 18. 
20. In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 2001); In re Cochrane, 124 F.3d 
978, 984 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Lewis, 97 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 1996). 
21. Storie, 216 B.R. at 287 followed by In re Merrill, 252 B.R. 497, 506 (B.A.P. 
10th Cir. 2000). See also In re Johnson, 691 F.2d 249, 256 (6th Cir. 1982) (promoting the 
objective standard which is similar to that of the negligence standard in that the impor­
tant legal status seemingly eradicates the need for intent or motive on the part of the 
fiduciary). 
22. Matter of Schwager, 121 F.3d 177, 185 (5th Cir. 1997); Meyer v. Rigdon, 36 
F.3d 1375, 1385 (7th Cir. 1994) (each finding that a fiduciary's willful neglect of his 
duties are not dischargeable). 
23. Baylis, 313 F.3d at 16. 
24. Id. at 18-19. 
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present an analysis of § 523(a)(4), a discussion of defalcation, and a 
determination of whether any level of intent is required for defalca­
tion under § 523(a)(4). This Note will conclude with a recommen­
dation that a standard of intent similar to willful neglect should be 
used to determine whether a fiduciary has committed defalcation. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This section will begin with an overview of bankruptcy's emer­
gence into American law and the changes that took place in its con­
version from English law. Continuing on this theme, the section 
will examine the view in American bankruptcy law that honest 
debtors should be afforded a fresh start and therefore be granted a 
discharge from their debts. Next, exceptions to this discharge of 
debt will be discussed, as well as the policies that underlie such ex­
ceptions and the contradictions between these policies and the fresh 
start policy. A discussion of the exception for "defalcation while 
acting in a fiduciary capacity" will follow with an emphasis on its 
ambiguity. 
A. History of the Bankruptcy Code and Discharge 
The origins of American bankruptcy law are traced to English 
bankruptcy law,25 the purpose of which was to promote commerce 
by providing a means of collection for creditors.26 Since only the 
creditor could bring a charge of bankruptcy against a debtor, bank­
ruptcy was involuntarily thrust upon the debtor.27 In early English 
bankruptcy law, the debtor received little mercy and severe punish­
ment, often by imprisonment28 and occasionally even death,29 for 
failure to pay his creditors. The type of debt or the intent of the 
debtor was of no concern, only that the debt to the creditor re­
mained outstanding.30 
The Constitution granted Congress the power to legislate on 
25. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United 
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INsT. L. REV. 5, 7 (1995) [hereinafter The History of the Bank­
ruptcy Laws]. 
26. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 
65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 327 (1991) [hereinafter Evolution of the Bankruptcy 
Discharge ). 
27. Id. at 330. 
28. Id. Bankruptcy was "quasi-criminal in nature." See also id. at 329 (articulat­
ing that English law's first bankruptcy law, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1542), was more of a 
criminal statute). 
29. Id. at 337. 
30. Id. at 330-31. 
98 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND'LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:93 
the subject of bankruptcy.31 Though the congressional power to 
legislate in this area was established early on, the body of legislation 
that has come to form bankruptcy law today developed slowly. In 
the beginnings of American bankruptcy law, federal statutes were 
sporadic32 and states freely enacted their own legislations33 that va­
ried in severity.34 From 1800 to 1803, federal bankruptcy law 
greatly resembled early English law and provided a low threshold 
for discharge of a merchant's debt, but did not provide a remedy for 
individual debtors.35 Though discharge was, in general, readily pro­
vided, the fraudulent debtor merchant was still subject to criminal 
punishment.36 
The temporary legislation enacted in 184137 introduced the 
revolutionary idea of voluntary bankruptcy for not only merchants, 
but also individual debtors.38 For the first time, an individual could 
use bankruptcy as a remedy to cure debt. The later Bankruptcy Act 
of 1867 maintained the availability of voluntary bankruptcy and in 
addition, it allowed corporations to apply for voluntary discharge.39 
Though the 1867 Act, like those before it, addressed a need for fed­
eral bankruptcy laws (since state laws could not reach nonresident 
debtors),40 congressional power to develop bankruptcy laws was 
not fully exercised until more lasting federal legislation went into 
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 4. In 1787, the Constitution empowered Congress 
to pass "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies." Id. 
32. The History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 13-14 (federal statutes 
existed temporarily from 1800-1803, 1841-1843, and 1867-1878 with each following a 
"major financial disaster"). 
33. Id. at 12-13. 
34. Id. at 13 (stating that varying state bankruptcy laws made interstate com­
merce difficult and unpredictable). 
35. Id. at 17. See Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 511 (2d 
Cir. 1937) ("Under the Act of 1800, 2 Stat. 19, 30 (Section 34), a discharge relieved 
bankrupts of all their debts without exception, provided they conducted themselves 
properly; but the statute applied only to those engaged in commerce and was confined 
to involuntary bankruptcies. "). 
36. Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 26, at 336; see also The 
History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 14 (debtors were not subject to death 
as under English bankruptcy law). 
37. An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy throughout the United 
States, Ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, 441 (1841) (repealed 1843). 
38. The History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 17. 
39. Ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (1867), repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160,20 Stat. 
99 (1878). See The History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 19-21 (the 1867 
Act also established the modern court system of bankruptcy giving district courts origi­
nal jurisdiction as bankruptcy courts). 
40. The History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 19. 
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effect in 1898.41 This legislation gave birth to "the modern era of 
liberal debtor treatment in United States bankruptcy laws"42 
marked by a limited number of exceptions to discharge.43 The 
Bankruptcy Code of 1898 firmly planted itself into American law 
and continued until the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,44 which 
has since been subject to a number of amendments.45 American 
bankruptcy law has thus evolved over time from its pro-creditor 
stance, which criminalized debtors, into its modern day pro-debtor 
rationale.46 
B. A Fresh Start for Honest Debtors 
With the arrival of the modern era of bankruptcy came the 
novel idea that the "honest but unfortunate debtor" should be af­
forded a "fresh start" through the discharge of his debt, which 
would, in turn, benefit both the debtor, by relieving him of his op­
pressive debt, and society, by allowing the debtor to become pro­
ductive once freed from this debt.47 The Bankruptcy Code allows 
41. An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United 
States, Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1979); The History of the Bankruptcy 
Laws, supra note 25, at 13-14 (Prior to the 1898 legislation, federal bankruptcy laws 
were in existence from 1800 to 1803 (a reprise of the old English bankruptcy model), 
from 1841 to 1843 (broke new ground introducing voluntary bankruptcy) and again 
from 1867 to 1878. From 1867 to 1878, corporations as well as individuals were allowed 
to take advantage of bankruptcy laws.). 
42. The History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 24. 
43. See id. at 24 n.153 (citing ch. 541, § 14, 30 Stat. at 550 (discharge granted 
unless debtor commits crime or fraudulently conceals financial condition)). See also id. 
at 19-20 (explaining how the 1898 law followed the 1878 repeal of the 1867 law, which 
laid down so many exceptions for discharge that only one-third of debtors actually re­
ceived discharge). 
44. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. 
45. The History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 32. See also S. REP. 
No. 521-32 (1976) ("widely regarded as a debtor's bill"). 
46. Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 26, at 364. 
47. [d. at 364-65. This was also thought to be a more humane view than previ­
ously taken by the English model of bankruptcy. See id. at 364. 
Under this bill no assent is required from the creditors. If the debtor has acted 
dishonestly by committing certain acts forbidden in the bill he will not be dis­
charged; if he has acted honestly he will be. The granting of a discharge is 
justified by a wise public policy. The granting or withholding of it is depen­
dent upon the honesty of the man, not upon the value of his estate. 
Id. See also Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 660 (1971) ("[O]ne of the purposes of the 
Bankruptcy Act is to 'relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebted­
ness and permit him to start afresh ...."') (quoting Williams v. United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention & Con­
sumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. REP. No. 107-3(1), at 6 (2001). 
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for a "fresh start" either through a liquidation or reorganization.48 
Through liquidation, the debtor surrenders his or her property, un­
less it is exempted, which is then liquidated and distributed amongst 
his or her creditors.49 Under reorganization, the debtor must follow 
an approved, structured plan to reorganize his or her finances.5o 
Through either liquidation or reorganization, the major goal 
for the debtor is to be discharged of his or her provable debts51 and 
freed from personal liability following the bankruptcy proceed­
ings.52 The fresh start that allows debtors to be relieved of their 
debts and collection by creditors is, however, to be made available 
only to honest debtors.53 The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated 
that the purpose of bankruptcy is to "relieve the honest debtor 
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start 
afresh ...."54 However, the current list of exceptions to discharge 
48. 1 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE 2D § 3:10 (2003). 
49. Id. 
50. Id. A debtor may file for liquidation under Chapter 7 (liquidation) of the 
Bankruptcy Code while reorganization, and payment through installments, is granted to 
the debtor under Chapters 11 and 13 (reorganization). See Bradley Kendall Mahanay, 
An Analysis of the Matter of Bennett and Its Effect on Non-Dischargeability of Debt for 
Defalcation While Acting in a Fiduciary Capacity, 46 BAYLOR L. REv. 281, 283 (1994) 
(Chapter 7 allows for discharge unless it is protested by a creditor, Chapter 11 provides 
discharge to non-individual debtors after a plan is approved, and Chapter 13 grants 
discharge after payments on the plan are concluded). See also Karen Gross, Preserving 
a Fresh Start for the Individual Debtor: The Case for Narrow Construction of the Con­
sumer Credit Amendments, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 59, 62-63 n.10 (1986) (explaining various 
remedies to bankruptcy). 
51. Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 331 (1934) ("The effect of a 
discharge in bankruptcy is to 'release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts,' with 
excepted liabilities enumerated in the statute.") (citing Bankruptcy Act § 17 (1867), 11 
U.S.c. § 35 (1898». 
52. See 3 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE 2D § 48:1, 48:2, 48:3 (2003) 
(citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,244 (1934) for the proposition that one of 
the main purposes of bankruptcy is to provide a manner in which a debtor can be freed 
from his creditors and enjoy "a new opportunity in life") [hereinafter 3 NORTON BANK­
RUPTCY LAW]. Cf Charles G. Hallinan, The "Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer Bank­
ruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 54 
(1986) (stating that the fresh start "was originally conceived not as a relief measure but 
as a reward for the debtor's efforts to maximize the return to his creditors"). 
53. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 514 (1938) ("The develop­
ment of bankruptcy legislation has been towards relieving the honest debtor from op­
pressive indebtedness and permitting him to start afresh."). 
54. Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915). See, 
e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991) ("But in the same breath that we 
have invoked this 'fresh start' policy, we have been careful to explain that the Act limits 
the opportunity for a completely unencumbered new beginning to the 'honest but un­
fortunate debtor."') (citation omitted). See also H.R. REp. No. 523-14 (1977) (explain­
ing "there is a Federal interest in seeing that a debtor that goes through bankruptcy 
comes out with adequate possessions to begin his fresh start"). 
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is long, nineteen to be exact, and not all are based on debtors who 
commit intentionally dishonest acts, such as fraud.55 Others are re­
lated to general policy categories, such as payment of alimony.56 
C. Exceptions to Discharge and Balancing Bankruptcy Policies 
The Bankruptcy Code57 may deny a debtor discharge entirely 
or may deny discharge on only a particular debt.58 Today, the 
Bankruptcy Code may deny discharge of nineteen categories of 
debt.59 Provisions like 11 U.S.c. § 523(a) "create exceptions only 
in situations where fairness to the parties warrants a deviation from 
accepted bankruptcy policies,"60 meaning that in certain circum­
stances the primary policy of a fresh start for the honest debtor is 
outweighed either by the importance of the debt or a societal 
goa1.61 These exceptions to discharge exist either because forgive­
ness of a certain type of debt ("type-based" exceptions), such as 
child support payments, would impede a social policy, or because 
55. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2003). 
56. § 523(a)(5); Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287. 
57. The History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, at 32 n.232 (noting the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is often called "The Act" or "The Code"). 
58. Radwan, supra note 2, at 988 n.6 (11 U.S.c. §§ 727(a), 727(d), 1141(d)(3), 
1228(b), 1228(d), 1328(b), and 1328(e) deny discharge completely and 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 523(a), 1222(b), and 1322(b) deny specific debts from discharge). 
59. § 523(a) (discharge will be denied for (1) debts for tax or customs duty; (2) for 
money or property obtained fraudulently; (3) not listed at the time of filing for bank­
ruptcy; (4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, 
or larceny; (5) for alimony or child support; (6) for willful and malicious injury by the 
debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity; (7) for fines or penalties 
payable to the government; (8) for educational loan; (9) for death or personal injury 
caused by driving while intoxicated; (10) for debts previously waived in a bankruptcy 
proceeding; (11) arising from any act of fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary 
capacity committed with respect to any depository institution or insured credit union; 
(12) for malicious or reckless failure to fulfill any commitment by the debtor to a Fed­
eral depository institutions regulatory agency to maintain the capital of an insured de­
pository institution; (13) for any payment of an order of restitution issued under U.S.c. 
title 18; (14) incurred to pay a nondischargeable tax; (15) incurred by a separation 
agreement; (16) for condominium fees; (17) for court fees; (18) owed under state law or 
to a municipality; (19) for violation of securities law). 
60. Radwan, supra note 2, at 993-94. See also id. at 994 n.22 (quoting George H. 
Singer, Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Fundamentals of Nondischargeability 
in Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 326 (1997)) ("The exceptions from 
discharge are set forth at § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code and are essentially the product 
of countervailing policy considerations in which the scales of justice tip in favor of cer­
tain creditors by allowing enumerated categories of obligations to remain virtually un­
scathed by the bankruptcy discharge."). 
61. Radwan, supra note 2, at 1000 (stating that the two purposes of the exceptions 
of 523 are "prevention of improper behavior by debtors and repayment of important 
debts"). 
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the debt resulted from some immoral or dishonest act committed by 
the debtor ("fault-based" exceptions),62 such as fraudulently filed 
tax returns.63 These § 523(a) exceptions deny discharge from debts 
that would "violate the bankruptcy objective" if a discharge were 
granted.64 
Bankruptcy law does not afford discharge that would not pro­
mote the primary objective of granting a fresh start to the honest 
debtor.65 Thus, debts arising out of fraud,66 from the debtor's "will­
ful and malicious" injury of person or property,67 and from personal 
injury and wrongful death claims based on the debtor's drunk driv­
ing are not dischargeable.68 Bankruptcy law also denies discharge 
to a debtor who has evaded an important social financial obliga­
tion69 such as taxes,70 a divorce settlement,71 child support or ali­
62. See In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2002) ("The other large category of 
bankruptcy exceptions [aside from type-based exceptions] relies on fault."). 
63. Id. at 18-19. The Baylis court suggests that type-based exceptions 
include debts for: taxes or customs duties, § 523(a)(1), or debts incurred to pay 
tax, § 523(a)(14); alimony and child support payments, § 523(a)(5); fines, pen­
alties or forfeitures to the government, § 523(a)(7); educational loans made or 
insured by the government or a nonprofit institution, § 523(a)(8); orders of 
restitution, § 523(a)(13); court fees, § 523(a)(17); and support owed under 
state law and enforceable under the Social Security Act, § 523(a)(18). 
[d. at 19 (internal citations omitted). On the other hand, fault-based exceptions include 
debts for "money, goods or services obtained by fraud or falsehood, § 523(a)(2); willful 
and malicious injury, § 523(a)(6); death or injury caused by driving under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs, § 523(a)(9) ...." [d. 
64. A narrow set of specified types of claims, however, are 'nondischargeable' 
in bankruptcy, which means that they remain owing to the creditor to the full 
extent unpaid. These are claims for which discharge would violate the bank­
ruptcy objective of giving a fresh start only to honest debtors (such as claims 
relating to fraud, or claims for criminal restitution obligations to victims) or 
which are considered to be of paramount societal importance (such as tax obli­
gations, and alimony and child support. 
Radwan, supra note 2, at 1000 (quoting H.R. REp. No. 102-1085, at 50-51 (1992); H.R. 
REp. No. 103-835, at 3341-42 (1994)); cf Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2001, H.R. REp. No. 107-3 pt. 1, at 459 (2001); Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1999, H.R. REp. No. 106-123, pt. 1, at 387 (1999) ("The Bankruptcy Code does 
not permit the discharge of certain debts whose payments are considered to be impor­
tant to society. [Such debts include those] incurred through the debtor's misconduct, 
such as debts arising from fraud and intentional injuries."). 
65. Radwan, supra note 2, at 1000. 
66. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2004). 
67. § 523(a)(6). 
68. § 523(a)(9); see Lawrence Kalevitch, Cheers? The Drunk-Driving Exception 
to Discharge, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213,217 (1989) (explaining that the reforms of 1978 
require that exceptions for fraud (§ 523(a)(2)), fraud or defalcation while acting in a 
fiduciary capacity (§ 523(a)(4)), and willful and malicious injury (§ 523(a)(6)) must be 
adjudicated by the courts before an exception to discharge will be implemented). 
69. Radwan, supra note 2, at 1000. 
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mony,n or an educational benefit or loan.73 Therefore, exceptions 
are designed either to promote the fresh start policy for "honest 
debtors," by deterring people from acting dishonestly, or to protect 
the interest of the creditor, by assuring that certain debts of impor­
tance, as dictated by Congress, remain an obligation of the debtor.74 
D. Confusion Surrounding the Defalcation Exception 
The exception to discharge for "defalcation while acting in a 
fiduciary capacity" does not so clearly fit into one of the two cate­
gories of type-based debt, for which fault on behalf of the debtor is 
not required, or fault-based debt, for which fault is required.75 If 
fault is required, then a fiduciary debtor committing defalcation 
must have some sort of intent to do SO.76 On the contrary, if the 
defalcation exception exists to promote the societal goal of ensuring 
that the special legal status of a fiduciary is held to the highest stan­
dards, then no intent would be required on behalf of the debtor.77 
Much of the uncertainty surrounding this exception stems from the 
fact that the Bankruptcy Code fails to provide definitions of "defal­
cation" and "fiduciary" and further because legislative history sheds 
little light on the terms.78 
To prove that a defalcation exception under § 523(a)(4) ap­
70. § 523( a )(1). 
71. § 523( a )(15). 
72. § 523(a)(5). 
73. § 523(a)(8). 
74. H.R. REp. No. 102-1085, at 50-1 (1992): 
The first [objective of bankruptcy law] is to give honest debtors who have 
fallen on hard times the opportunity for a fresh start in life, after they have 
made a good-faith attempt to pay what they can ... [t]he second objective of 
the bankruptcy system is to protect creditors in general by preventing an insol­
vent debtor from selectively paying off the claims of certain favored creditors 
at the expense of others. 
Id. 
75. § 523(a)(4). See In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[M]ost of the 
exceptions to discharge in bankruptcy are in place for one of two basic reasons[,] ... 
policy ... [and] type of debt ...."). 
76. Baylis, 313 F.3d at 18-19. 
77. 3 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW, supra note 52, at § 47:29 ("The 'badness' re­
lated to defalcation by a fiduciary is supplied 'by an individual's special legal status with 
respect to another, with its attendant duties and high standards of dealing, and the act 
of breaching these duties.") (citation omitted). 
78. In re Storie, 216 B.R. 283, 286 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997); In re Twitchell, 72 B.R. 
431,434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1987). See also Radwan, supra note 2, at 1029 (citing to Sheet 
Metal Workers Int'I Assoc. v. Carter, 450 U.S. 949, 952 (1981)) ("When that statute is 
not entirely clear, however, legislative history may be used to aid in determining the 
true interpretation of the statute."). 
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plies, the creditor must first prove that the debtor was a fiduciary 
and then, establish that defalcation has occurred while the debtor 
was acting in that fiduciary capacityJ9 Initially, the courts had diffi­
culty in determining when a debtor was acting in a "fiduciary capac­
ity"SO because, like the term "defalcation," the Bankruptcy Code 
lacks a definition.s1 In 1934, the Supreme Court solved half of this 
problem when it determined that unlike the term fiduciary by itself, 
which generally means a relationship of trust, acting in a "fiduciary 
capacity" requires the formation of a relationship in which a person 
entrusts his or her property to the care of another.s2 Since the Su­
preme Court decision of Chapman v. Forsyth, "fiduciary capacity" 
is to be read strictly to constitute express trusts, meaning "special" 
or "technical" trusts, rather "than implied" trusts created by the 
debtor's conduct.S3 Therefore "fiduciary capacity" is limited to re­
lationships such as those of an attorney-client, managing partner­
partner, or corporate office-corporation, where an express trust is 
created.s4 Further, the trust relationship must exist prior to any 
79. Leah A. Kahl & Peter C. Ismay, Exceptions to Discharge for Fraud or Defal­
cation While Acting in a Fiduciary Capacity, 7 J. BANKR. L. & PRACT. 119, 120 (1998). 
See also Mahanay, supra note 50, at 284 (citing to In re Bennett, 989 F.2d 779, 784 (5th 
Cir. 1993) for the proposition that the court must first find a trust obligation that rises to 
the level of a fiduciary relationship and must then determine if a defalcation was 
committed). 
80. Kahl & Ismay, supra note 79, at 120. 
81. Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934). See also Kahl & 
Ismay, supra note 79, at 120 ("The Code does not define 'fiduciary capacity' ...."). 
82. Davis, 293 U.S. at 332 (interpreting the term "fiduciary capacity" as stated in 
§ 17(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Act, now § 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code). See also 
Summers, supra note 12, at 316 (citing In re Interstate Agency, Inc., 760 F.2d 121, 124 
(6th Cir. 1985» (state law determines whether the trust is express and therefore can be 
subject to § 523(a)(4) (§ 17(a)(4) at the time this case was decided). See also Bennett, 
989 F.2d at 784 (5th Cir. 1993) ("The scope of the concept of fiduciary under 
[§ 523(a)(4)] is a question of federal law; however, state law is important in determining 
whether or not a trust obligation exists. "). 
83. Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 202, 208 (1844), cited by Cent. Hanover 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 511 (2d Cir. 1937). See also Kahl & Ismay, 
supra note 79, at 120 (an express trust is one which is marked by clear language and 
intent to create a trust relationship). But see In re Hayes, 183 F.3d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 
1999) ("[N]umerous cases have applied the defalcation exception to debts owed by cor­
porate officers, notwithstanding the absence of any express trust."). 
84. Kahl & Ismay, supra note 79, at 122-23 (distinguishing ordinary commercial 
relationships or personal/familial relationships that do not constitute a fiduciary capac­
ity under § 523(a)(4». See id. for a discussion of types of fiduciary relationships that 
may be affected by § 523(a)(4). See also Janet A. Flaccus, Attorney Malpractice Judg­
ments, Bankruptcy Discharge and Professional Responsibility, 4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 
219, 223 (1995). Many cases involving a contractor who is required to pay his material­
man have found that the contractor is acting in a fiduciary capacity because the statutes 
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wrongdoing.85 
Under the present construction of § 523(a)(4), the term "fidu­
ciary" is read narrowly, to include only express trusts. This, cou­
pled with a broad reading of "defalcation," is not easily "reconciled 
with the concept of a fresh start for the 'honest but unfortunate' 
debtor"86 because it presents a lower threshold of proof for a credi­
tor than any of the other exceptions for discharge.87 With such a 
construction, once evidence of the existence of an express trust is 
shown the creditor needs to prove only that the debtor had an obli­
gation to the trust which was not met in order to find the debtor 
guilty of a defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.88 
Similarly, Congress has given no evidence of its intentions in 
using the word defalcation in the context of exceptions to discharge 
and, as a result, courts have been in disagreement as to how the 
word should be interpreted.89 Some definitions of defalcation ac­
cepted by the courts include: "the failure to meet an obligation" or 
a "nonfraudulent default,"90 embezzlement,91 "misappropriation of 
regarding this relationship determined which beneficiaries were to be paid first. Id. (cit­
ing Carlisle Cashway Inc. v. Johnson, 691 F.2d 249, 251-54 (6th Cir. 1982». 
85. Bennett, 989 F.2d at 784 (citing Upshur v. Brisco, 138 U.S. 365, 378 (1890». 
See also Davis, 293 U.S. at 333 (adding the criteria that these special trust must be 
created prior to the alleged fraud or defalcation and stating the trust must exist prior to 
the circumstances leading to bankruptcy). 
86. 3 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW, supra note 52, at § 47:29. The narrow reach of 
fiduciary could therefore preclude some deviant acts that simply did not fall under the 
express trust category while honest debtors making innocent mistakes could be held to 
have committed defalcation if they are entrusted to an express trust when making the 
unfortunate mistake. Id. 
87. Kahl & Ismay, supra note 79, at 136. 
88. Id. A fiduciary can be charged with defalcation if there is a decrease in funds 
and can also be charged with defalcation for inappropriately using funds, since a fiduci­
ary is charged with knowledge of the law and his obligations to the trust. Id. 
89. In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2002). See also Flaccus, supra note 84, at 
229-30; In re Janikowski, 60 B.R. 784, 789-90 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (suggesting that defalca­
tion may be applied to property, perhaps even a cause of action, as well as funds). Thus 
another question, which will not be answered by this Note, is to which type(s) of prop­
erty should defalcation be applied? 
90. See In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 427 (7th ed. 1999» (defining "defalcation"). But see A DICTIONARY OF 
MODERN AMERICAN USAGE (B. Garner ed. 1998), cited by Baylis, 313 F.3d at 18 n.4 
("[S]ome writers have misused defalcation when referring to a non-fraudulent 
default. "). 
91. See Baylis, 313 F.3d at 17 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 427 (7th ed. 
1999» (defining "defalcation"). This edition of Black's also uses defalcation as a syno­
nym for embezzlement (meaning, according to this edition of Black's, "[t]he fraudulent 
taking of personal property with which one has been entrusted, esp[ecially] as a 
fiduciary"). 
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trust funds or money held in a fiduciary capacity; [the] failure to 
properly account for such funds,"92 or "the embezzlement, misap­
propriation of trust funds held in a fiduciary capacity, and failure to 
properly account for trust funds."93 When the term defalcation is 
used outside of the § 523(a)(4) exception, it is usually to show that 
fiduciaries breached their duty; most often in association with ac­
counting for funds entrusted to them.94 
In 1937, the Second Circuit stated in Central Hanover that 
"'defalcation,' ordinarily implies some moral dereliction ...."95 
This was the first case to map out thoroughly the history of the term 
in bankruptcy legislation96 and was the first to question (but leave 
unanswered) whether an act of defalcation requires specific in­
tent.97 In tracing the history of the term, Judge Learned Hand 
noted that "defalcation" was first used in the Bankruptcy Act of 
1841, not as an exception to discharge, but as part of a definition for 
those who would be eligible for voluntary bankruptcy.98 In 1867, 
the term was used as one of the original exceptions to discharge, 
that of "defalcation as a public officer, or while acting in any fiduci­
ary character."99 Searching for the original meaning of the term, 
92. In re Cochrane, 124 F.3d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 1997). 
93. In re Friedman, 298 B.R. 487,503 (Bankr. D.Mass. 2003). 
94. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 13 (1991) (where a 
licensed insurance agent committed defalcations in misappropriating payments for life 
insurance premiums when the policies had expired); U.S. v. Porter, 90 F.3d 64, 70 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (where an employee of financial brokerage firms committed defalcations in 
misdirecting customers' funds to her own banking account). 
95. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 511 (2d Cir. 1937). 
96. In re Storie, 216 B.R. 283, 288 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). 
97. Hanover, 93 F.2d at 511 ('''[D]efalcation,' ordinarily implies some moral der­
eliction, but in this context it may have included innocent defaults, so as to include all 
fiduciaries who for any reason were short in their accounts.") (emphasis added). Also 
note the use of "in this context" seems to suggest that the use of defalcation as part of a 
definition, its original use in the Bankruptcy Code, rather than as an exception, "may 
have included innocent defaults." 
98. Id. Defalcation first appears in 5 Stat. 440 § 1: 

All persons whatsoever, residing in any state, district or territory of the United 

States, owing debts, which shall not have been created in consequence of de­

falcation as a public officer, or as executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, 

or while acting in any other fiduciary capacity, who shall by petition ... apply 





An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United States, 
ch. 9, 4 Stat. 440, 441 (1841) (repealed 1843». 
99. Hanover, 93 F.2d at 511 (citing section 33 of the Act of 1867). See also supra 
note 43 and accompanying text (stating the 1867 law was repealed because it laid down 
so many exceptions for discharge that only one-third of debtors actually received 
discharge) . 
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the court posited that "defalcation" must not mean "fraud or em­
bezzlement," since the terms were juxtaposed in the Act of 1867, 
and therefore defalcation "must here have covered defaults other 
than deliberate malversions ...."100 Since Central Hanover, the cir­
cuit courts have disagreed on whether a debtor must have intent to 
constitute defalcation.101 
E. The Circuit Split 
Although Central Hanover began the discussion and proposed 
some possible considerations as to the meaning of defalcation, the 
court held only that "when a fiduciary takes money upon a condi­
tional authority which may be revoked and knows at the time that it 
may, he is guilty of a 'defalcation' though it may not be a 'fraud,' or 
an 'embezzlement,' or perhaps not even a 'misappropriation.' "102 
The court did not conclude whether any level of mens rea was re­
quired to constitute defalcation. However, Judge Learned Hand's 
opinion provoked controversy by stating: "defalcation ... may have 
included innocent defaults ... ."103 Relying on this dictum as pre­
cedent, some circuits have ruled that even innocent mistakes made 
by a fiduciary could cause a particular debt to be excepted from 
discharge.104 Others have held that a standard of negligence is re­
quired for a defalcation exception.105 Still other circuits have held 
that a "willful neglect of duty" or "recklessness" standard must be 
100. Hanover, 93 F.2d at 511; The History of the Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 25, 
at 19-20. See An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the 
United States, ch. 176,14 Stat. 517,533 (1867) (codified in Title LXI Rev. Stat. § 5117 
(1878) (repealed 1878» ("No debt created by the fraud or embezzlement of the bank­
rupt, or by his defalcation as a public officer, or while acting in any fiduciary character, 
shall be discharged under this act."). 
101. In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2002) (recognizing that Hanover's sug­
gestion that a defalcation may exist where a fiduciary commits an innocent mistake has 
caused differing camps of interpretations to spring up among the courts). 
102. Hanover, 93 F.2d at 512. 
103. Id. at 511. 
104. In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[N]egligence or even an 
innocent mistake which results in misappropriation or failure to account is sufficient 
[for defalcation]."); In re Cochrane, 124 F.3d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[D]efalcation 
'includes the innocent default of a fiduciary who fails to account fully for money re­
ceived.' ") (citing In re Lewis, 97 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 1996»; Lewis, 97 F.3d at 1186 
(" '[D]efalcation' includes innocent, as well as intentional or negligent defaults so as to 
reach the conduct of all fiduciaries who were short in their accounts.") (quoting In re 
Baird, 114 B.R. 198, 204 (B. A. P. 9th Cir. 1990». 
105. In re Storie, 216 B.R. 283, 287 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997) (reasoning that negli­
gence would be appropriate since "a fiduciary [should] be charged with knowledge of 
his ... duties and of the law ...") (citing In re Johnson, 691 F.2d 249, 257 (6th Cir. 
1982». See generally Hoff v. Carroll, 140 B.R. 313 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992). 
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adopted to establish whether defalcation by a fiduciary occurred.106 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASES 
Throughout the circuits, courts that have addressed the issue of 
whether intent is necessary for defalcation have done so against a 
background of vastly different factual circumstances. This section 
will explore those facts and the resulting decisions of the courts by 
beginning with the introductory case of Central Hanover. Next, this 
section will discuss In re Johnson which took an objective approach 
and held that specific intent is not required. A discussion of those 
cases which have held negligence or innocent mistake is required 
will follow. This section will conclude with a discussion of cases 
that determined some type of intent is required on behalf of the 
debtor to deny discharge for defalcation. 
A. Initiating the Discussion in Central Hanover 
As mentioned above, Central Hanover was the case that first 
asked what standard must be met for a debtor acting in a fiduciary 
capacity to be denied discharge under then 35 U.S.c. § 17(a)(4) of 
the Bankruptcy Act, today's 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).107 In a foreclo­
sure proceeding, the New York Supreme Court appointed a dentist, 
Herbst, as receiver of the land subject to foreclosure and, as a re­
ceiver, acted in a fiduciary capacity.108 Upon sale of the land, 
Herbst applied to the court and received fees for his work as re­
ceiver, which he either knew or should have known he would be 
forced to return if the plaintiff was successful on appea1.109 Before 
the appeal was entered, Herbst spent the money in question.110 On 
appeal, the New York Court of Appeals instructed him to return 
the money that he had already spent. 
Herbst then filed for bankruptcy seeking discharge of this 
debt. ll1 Herbst was adjudicated a voluntary bankrupt. The district 
court, however, determined that this particular debt could not be 
discharged because his actions constituted "fraud, embezzlement, 
misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any 
106. Matter of Schwager, 121 F.3d 177, 185 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Meyer, 36 F.3d 
1375, 1384 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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fiduciary capacity."112 The Second Circuit took up the case, and 
having determined that Herbst was acting in a fiduciary capacity 
when he spent the money entrusted to his care, dealt only with 
whether the act was defalcation.113 The court reasoned that 
Herbst's debt was non-dischargeable because it was taken upon 
conditional authority, which Herbst, as a fiduciary, should have 
known at the time would prohibit him from spending the money.114 
Under these factual circumstances, the Second Circuit determined 
that the debtor, who "had not been entirely innocent," would not 
be allowed to discharge the debt because his actions constituted de­
falcation.1 15 The court asked, but did not answer, if there were 
other instances in which an innocent mistake on the part of a fiduci­
ary could satisfy the exception for defalcation.116 
Since this question was initially posed in Central Hanover, 
courts have struggled to determine whether an innocent mistake is 
all that is required to satisfy "defalcation while acting in a fiduciary 
capacity."117 Some courts have answered this question affirma­
tively. Others have not. 
B. View of the Defalcation Exception as a Type-Based Debt 
This section will focus on decisions that have interpreted 
§ 523(a)(4) as a type-based debt exception.118 It will begin with a 
look at the In re lohnson 119 decision, which determined an objec­
tive approach requiring no intent is appropriate. It will then discuss 
cases determining that negligence or an innocent mistake will con­
stitute a defalcation. 
112. In re Herbst, 22 F. Supp. 353, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). See also 35 U.S.c. 
§ 17(a)(4) (repealed 1979). 
113. Hanover, 93 F.2d at 511. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 512 (indicating that some misconduct must be inferred from Herbst's 
actions, since he should have known that the funds were subject to return, but also 
noted that a deficiency in funds alone might be defalcation). See Flaccus, supra note 84, 
at 231. See also In re Hayes, 183 F.3d 162, 172 (2d Cir. 1999) (assuming, as did the court 
in Hanover, that "defalcation demands 'some portion of misconduct'" and holding that 
the attorney/executor of Andy Warhol's estate committed a defalcation in basing his 
fees for legal services on an invalid retainer agreement). 
116. Hanover, 93 F.2d at 512. 
117. In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2002). 
118. See Radwan, supra note 2, at 993-94 (such exceptions to the fresh start policy 
and discharge will only be created "in situations where fairness to the parties warrants a 
deviation from [these] accepted bankruptcy policies"). 
119. In re Johnson, 691 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1982), questioned by In re Little, 163 
B.R. 497 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Mich. 1994). 
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1. No Intent Required 
The Sixth Circuit case of In re lohnson 12o followed the lead of 
previous decisions121 to determine that an objective standard 
should be used to establish whether a contractor had committed a 
defalcation subject to § 523(a)(4) by failing to pay his material sup­
pliers in violation of a Michigan statute.122 The Central Hanover 
court's statement that "defalcations were not limited to deliberate 
malversions" was interpreted by the In re Johnson court to mean 
that no intent is required for a fiduciary to commit a defalcation 
and be denied discharge of the debtP3 This conclusion was backed 
by the policy consideration that the bankrupt is charged with 
knowledge of the law.124 Charging such knowledge of the law, the 
court's reasoning is in line with the fresh start policy since it does 
not weigh the intent or motive of the debtor.125 Unlike other ex­
ceptions of the Bankruptcy Code, where the language clearly re­
120. Id. See In re Storie, 216 B.R. 283, 288 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997) (using similar 
analysis with similar factual circumstances to conclude that "'[d]efalcation' ... is ... 
failure to account for funds ... whether intentional, willful, reckless, or negligent"); 
Little, 163 B.R. at 499 (agreeing with In· re Johnson that intent is not required for defal­
cation, but arguing that, to the extent that In re Johnson ruled that federal law alone 
brought a cause of action for defalcation, it is overruled, since state law determines the 
nature of the trust). 
121. See Carey Lumber Co. v. Bell, 615 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 1980); Matter of 
Kawczynski, 442 F. Supp. 413, 418 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Matter of Polidoro, 12 B.R. 867, 
870 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). 
122. Johnson, 691 F.2d at 252. The Michigan Building Contract Fund Act created 
a trust by statute between a contractor and subcontractors (trustee) and also imposed a 
duty on the contractor to pay the subcontractors prior to making any other purchases or 
payments with such funds. Id. The Act also provided that a contractor would be guilty 
of a felony if he intentionally used such funds for any other purpose. Id. See also Turner 
v. Ward, 154 U.S. 618 (1876); Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-13 (1960) 
(articulating that state law determines the nature of the trust). 
123. Johnson, 691 F.2d at 254-55. While the language in the case suggests that a 
mistake would constitute defalcation, because no intent is required, the court makes the 
clarifying statement that "[w]e hold that the objective fact that monies paid into the 
building contract fund were used for purposes other than to pay laborers ... first is 
sufficient to constitute a defalcation under section 17(a)(4) so long as the use was not 
the result of mere negligence or a mistake of fact ...." Id. at 257. See also Flaccus, 
supra note 84, at 231-32 (suggesting that this language may indicate that "the act must 
be intentional but the motive is irrelevant"). 
124. Johnson, 691 F.2d at 257 (arguing that the objective standard would prevent 
fiduciaries from using ignorance of the law as an excuse). See also id. at 255-56 ("An 
objective standard for finding a defalcation, that does charge a bankrupt with knowl­
edge of the law and that does not weigh intent or motive, is consistent with the policy 
behind the bankruptcy laws of giving an honest debtor the opportunity for economic 
rehabilitation.") (citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,234 (1934». 
125. Johnson, 691 F.2d at 255-56. 
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quires unscrupulous conduct,126 such "badness" or dishonesty (or 
fault) is inferred in 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(4) from the debtor's failure 
to conform with the requirements of the fiduciary's special legal sta­
tuS.127 The court expressed that dispensing with the need for intent 
in this case would further ensure that the fiduciary would take extra 
precaution in caring for funds that belong to another and in avoid­
ing the possibility of breaching such duties,128 
However, as noted by the dissent in In re Johnson, this case 
involved the question of whether the debtor violated the Michigan 
Building Contract Fund Act, specifically requiring proof of intent to 
defraud.129 Therefore, although the court in In re Johnson declared 
a standard that "does not weigh intent or motive," a finding of in­
tent was required in the state's statute,130 The dissent also stated 
that "no interpretation of state law" could eliminate federal law's 
fresh start opportunity and that without proof of intent of fraud or 
defalcation, the debtor should be discharged of his debt.131 
2. Negligence or Innocent Mistake is Sufficient 
In a case involving an ambassador, by definition a fiduciary of 
the country represented, the Fourth Circuit decided that the ambas­
sador's actions need not "rise to the level of embezzlement or even 
misappropriation" to make the debt non-dischargeable.132 Since 
the responsibilities of an ambassador are so crucial to the embassy 
he serves, it mattered only that the ambassador had used embassy 
funds to further his own interests; his intent at the time he did so 
was of no consequence,133 Using the dictionary definition that de­
126. 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2002) (exception for "actual fraud"); 11 U.S.c. 
§ 523(a)(6) (2004) (exception for "willful and malicious injury" to another). 
127. Johnson, 691 F.2d at 256. 
128. Id. at 255-56. When entrusted funds are used for other than intended pur­
poses, defalcation is sufficiently met "so long as the use was not the result of mere 
negligence or a mistake of fact ...." Id. at 257. 
129. Id. at 260 (Edwards, C.]., dissenting). See also supra note 122 and accompa­
nying text (the Michigan Statute itself provided that a contractor would be guilty of a 
felony if he intentionally used such funds for any other purpose). 
130. Johnson, 691 F.2d at 260 (Edwards, C.]., dissenting). See also supra note 128 
and accompanying text. 
131. Johnson, 691 F.2d at 261 (Edwards C.]., dissenting). 
132. In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Pahlavi v. Ansari, 
113 F.3d 17, 20 (4th Cir. 1997». 
133. Uwimana, 274 F.3d at 811-12 (the agent, Uwimana, committed a defalcation 
by failing to disclose his acts to, or seek consent from, the principal, the government of 
the state he represented). 
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falcation is the "failure to meet an obligation,"134 the court rejected 
the ambassador's argument that the transfer of money was "within 
the scope of his discretion as ambassador."135 Instead, it found that 
because the ambassador used funds that belonged to the country he 
represented without disclosing the act, he had committed defalca­
tion and therefore his debt should remain outstanding.136 For the 
Fourth Circuit, "negligence or even an innocent mistake which re­
sults in misappropriation or failure to account is sufficient"137 to 
prove defalcation. 
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have also reasoned that a fiduci­
ary need not have a specific intent to commit defalcation.138 In In 
re Cochrane, an attorney representing his partnership failed to dis­
close pertinent information in order to continue to participate per­
sonally in the deal without the partnership's knowledge.139 The 
court held that when an express trust exists in an attorney-client 
relationship, no evidence of an intentional wrongdoing is required 
for defalcation.140 
The Ninth Circuit has changed its view of whether defalcation 
requires some sort of intent on the part of the debtor. In 1993, the 
In re Martin opinion noted that defalcation has a broad range of 
meanings and may entail "moral dereliction . . . imply[ing] some 
bad faith or misconduct" or may include innocent defaults as noted 
by Central Hanover,141 The court stated that "[a]n exception to dis­
charge impairs the debtor's fresh start and should not be read more 
broadly than necessary to effectuate policy ...."142 Using this ap­
proach, the court held that defalcation must require some bad faith 
intent.143 The In re Martin court also found it inconsistent to re­
quire intent for "fraud," "embezzlement," and "larceny" III 
§ 523(a)(4), but not for a finding of "defalcation."144 
134. Id. at 811 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 427 (7th ed. 1999» (defining 
"defalcation"). 
135. Uwimana, 274 F.3d at 811. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. In re Cochrane, 124 F.3d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Lewis, 97 F.3d 1182, 
1186 (9th Cir. 1996). 
139. Cochrane, 124 F.3d at 984. 
140. Id. Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit states that fraud, embezzlement and lar­
ceny, also included in § 523(a)(4), are "solely intentional wrongs" while defalcation "in­
clude[s] innocent or negligent misdeeds." !d. 
141. In re Martin, 161 B.R. 672, 677 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993). 
142. Id. at 678. 
143. Id. 
144. See id. (noting that cases such as In re Short, 818 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1987), 
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Three years later, In re Lewis overruled this decision.145 In de­
termining that Arizona state law defined a partnership as "embod­
[ying] an express ... trust," the Ninth Circuit found that members 
of a partnership committed defalcation in commingling their part­
nership funds with their own independent venture.146 Overruling 
In re Martin,147 the court held that "an individual may be liable for 
defalcation without having the intent to defraud."148 
Though the fiduciary relationships in the above cases varied, 
each circuit ruled that defalcation occurs if there is an express trust 
creating a fiduciary relationship within the meaning of 
§ 523(a)(4)149 and if the fiduciary breached that duty in failing to 
account for funds.15o In coming to this conclusion, the Fourth, 
Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits did not have to determine if the 
fiduciaries in question did, in fact, have intent to breach their du­
ties.151 The only inquiry needed was whether the fiduciaries im­
properly used funds entrusted to them.152 
C. View of the Defalcation Exception as a Fault-Based Debt 
Reasoning that exceptions to discharge should be narrowly 
construed to provide the debtor with a fresh start, other circuits 
present an opposing view and require some type of intent on the 
part of the debtor to constitute "defalcation" under § 523(a)(4).153 
which hold that defalcation includes failure to account for funds, "contain facts which 
indicate some degree of culpability greater than mere negligence"). Cf id. at 679-80 
(Perris, B.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the requisite culpa­
bility need only be found in failure to conform to the fiduciary's special legal status). 
145. In re Lewis, 97 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 1996). 
146. [d. at 1185-86. 
147. Martin, 161 B.R. at 678 ("[M]ere failure to use ordinary care in accounting 
for an asset does not per se constitute 'defalcation' within the context of § 523(a)(4)."). 
148. Lewis, 97 F.3d at 1187. 
149. In re Cochrane, 124 F.3d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 1997). 
150. Lewis, 97 F.3d at 1186. 
151. Though in some of the cases the judges outright doubted that the fiduciaries 
were innocent in their actions. See Cochrane 124 F.3d at 984; Quaif v. Johnson, 4 F.3d 
950, 955 (11th Cir. 1993). 
152. Cf In re Johnson, 691 F.2d 249, 257 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating that as long as 
the "funds were used for purposes other than to pay laborers ... so long as the use was 
not the result of mere negligence or a mistake of fact . . . subjective intent ... is 
irrelevant"). 
153. In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2002); Matter of Schwager, 121 F.3d 
177, 185 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Martin, 161 B.R. 672, 677-78 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993); 
Matter of Moreno, 892 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1990). See also Meyer v. Ridgon, 36 F.3d 
1375, 1380-81 (7th Cir. 1994). In defining § 523(a)(11) (exempts discharge for debts 
arising from any act of fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity commit­
ted with respect to any depository institution or insured credit union), the Meyer court 
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These courts reason that the exceptions to discharge should be nar­
rowly construed to provide the debtor with a fresh start.154 
Matter of Moreno 155 was the first of the Fifth Circuit cases that 
defined defalcation as "a willful neglect of duty."156 As president, 
and hence, officer and fiduciary of a large corporation, Moreno 
transferred more than $200,000 to himself and other companies in 
which he maintained a separate interest without repaying any por­
tion, securing promissory notes, or paying interest.157 In Matter of 
Schwager, the court found that the managing partner of a partner­
ship involved in restaurant operation had breached his fiduciary 
duty to the partnership by acting "intentionally, maliciously or with 
heedless and reckless disregard of· the rights of the limited part­
ners."158 The court determined that such an intentional or reckless 
action met the elements of defalcation,159 but also noted that these 
Fifth Circuit cases concerning such intentional conduct also in­
volved a degree of financial impropriety.16o Its interpretation of 
Central Hanover led this circuit to conclude that "defalcation re­
quires a lesser standard than fraud, and ... does not require actual 
intent" and therefore a standard of "recklessness"161 was appropri­
looked to the almost identical language of § 523(a)(4) to conclude that § 523(a)(4) must 
have been added to "limit the bankruptcy court's ability to nullify regulatory victories 
through its independent power to determine dischargeability" in order to prevent bank­
ers from using discharge as an escape for their misconduct. Id. The court agreed that 
"defalcation," as interpreted by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits must mean more than "neg­
ligent breach of a fiduciary duty." Id. at 1384-85. 
154. Meyer, 36 F.3d at 1385. 
155. Moreno, 892 F.2d at 421. 
156. Schwager, 121 F.3d at 184. See also In re Bennett, 989 F.2d 779, 790 (5th Cir. 
1993) (determining that a managing partner had committed defalcation "as a result of 
the willful neglect of his fiduciary duties as the managing partner of the limited ... 
partnership" when he charged limited partners for expenses that were meant to be 
charged to the partnership). 
157. Moreno, 892 F.2d at 421 (concluding that such activities constituted defalca­
tion, the court determined that whether Moreno personally benefited from the funds 
was "significant but not necessarily determinative" in its decision). 
158. Schwager, 121 F.3d at 182 n.4 (defining "maliciously" as "conduct that is 
specifically intended to cause substantial injury or damage; or ... an act that is carried 
out with flagrant disregard for the rights of others and with actual awareness," and 
"heedless and reckless disregard" as "more than a momentary thoughtlessness, inadver­
tence or error of judgment"). 
159. [d. at 185. 
160. [d. Cf Carey Lumber Co. v. Bell, 615 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding no 
intentional conduct is required for § 523(a)(4)). 
161. Schwager, 121 F.3d at 185 n.12 (citing U.S. v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 245 
(1985), which defined "willful neglect," though not in the context of bankruptcy, as "a 
conscious, intentional failure or reckless indifference"). 
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ately applied to § 523( a)( 4 ).162 
The First Circuit most recently joined this discussion in In re 
Baylis, which stated that defalcation "requires some degree of fault, 
closer to fraud, without the necessity of meeting a strict specific in­
tent requirement. "163 Baylis, a case of first impression for this cir­
cuit, examined the fiduciary relationship between an attorney, 
acting as a co-trustee, and the beneficiaries of the trust.l64 Attor­
ney Baylis drafted the trust and was appointed trustee along with 
the settlor's daughter, who also served as paid manager of certain 
income properties benefiting the truSt.165 The beneficiaries of the 
trust claimed that Baylis had committed defalcation in two ways. 
First, they claimed he failed to properly advise to his co-trustee of 
her obligations to the trust when she made her decision not to sign 
an agreement to sell income properties to buyers who had already 
signed purchase and sale agreements.166 Second, the beneficiaries 
claimed that he used trust funds to pay for and settle a lawsuit 
brought against him by the prospective buyers of the income 
properties, as well as to pay his own legal expenses after being sued 
by the trust itself.167 
In determining if either of these actions constituted defalca­
tion, the First Circuit applied its new interpretation of 
§ 523(a)(4),168 The court plainly stated that Baylis, as an attorney 
specializing in trusts and estates, had knowledge of the law and the 
duties to which he was bound as a fiduciary of the truSt.169 Though 
162. Schwager, 121 F.3d at 185 (citing 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 
§ 523.1O(1)(b) (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th rev. ed. 1997) and 2 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET 
AL., BANKRUPTCY, § 7-28 at 368 (1992» ("Fraud requires some intent; defalcation re­
quires none."). The Schwager court interpreted this to mean that "[w]hile defalcation 
may not require actual intent, it does require some level of mental culpability." Id. 
163. In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2002). 
164. Id. at 14-16. 
165. Id. at 14. 
166. Id. at 15. The beneficiaries also claimed that the debts should not be dis­
charged as they resulted from Baylis's "willful and malicious injury ... to the property 
of another" under 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(6) (2004). Id. at 16. See also Rutanen v. Ballard, 
678 N.E.2d 133, 136-37 (Mass. 1992). In addition, Baylis was aware that his co-trustee 
did not desire to sell the properties. Baylis, 313 F.3d at 14. Regardless, Baylis acquired 
purchasers for the properties and drew up purchase and sale agreements which Ballard, 
the co-trustee, then refused to sign. Id. at 14. 
167. Baylis, 313 F.3d at 21. Baylis's own actions, in obtaining the buyers and in 
failing to properly advise the co-trustee of her need to sell, brought about the original 
lawsuit between the proposed purchasers of the properties and the trust. Id. at 14-15, 
22. 
168. Id. at 21-22. 
169. Id. 
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Baylis was obligated to use reasonable care to advise his co-trustee 
and prevent her from committing a breach of her own duty to the 
trust, the court stated that if Baylis had acted "reasonably" in re­
gard to his duties there would be no defalcation.170 Since Baylis 
initially went to the probate court to receive instructions to sell 
(though he did not disclose his co-trustee's aversion to the sale), the 
court held that his actions did not constitute defalcation because "it 
was not unreasonable for Baylis to think the matter would be re­
solved if the court gave instructions to sell the property."l71 
In deciding whether the second matter, Baylis's use of money 
from the trust to fund his own legal expenses, constituted defalca­
tion, the First Circuit noted that it is not always inappropriate for a 
trustee to receive payments from the trust.172 However, the pro­
bate court's lower decision found that the trust had no obligation to 
defend Baylis, because he had brought about the lawsuit by his own 
careless actions and inactions.173 Baylis violated his duty of loyalty 
by causing the suit against the trust (over his failure to sell the 
properties) and then by using money from the trust to settle that 
lawsuit, as well to defend against allegations of his own personal 
fraud.174 This circuit court found that these actions by Baylis satis­
fied the "defalcation" exception under the Bankruptcy Code.175 
The varying factual circumstances described above and the di­
verse holdings of the circuit courts gives an overview of the manner 
in which numerous courts have dealt with the issue of intent and 
defalcation. The analysis that follows will strive to provide clarity 
on the issue for the future use of courts faced with this historical 
dilemma. 
III. ANALYSIS 
This section will begin with a discussion of the balancing act 
170. Id. at 22. 
171. Id. at 22-23 (noting that the breach of loyalty of Ballard, the co-trustee, in 
refusing to sign purchase and sale agreements giving rise to the lawsuit, was also egre­
gious enough to be defalcation). See also id. at 23 (stating that Baylis's judgments 
about how to deal with the actions of his co-trustee were "clearly negligent, but not so 
reckless as to rise to the level of fault needed to constitute a defalcation"). 
172. Id. at 21. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 22. 
175. Id. "Baylis's actions as to this component of the debt do constitute defalca­
tion. He used trust monies to ... settle the lawsuit . . .. His breach of the duty of 
loyalty is exacerbated by the fact that Baylis ... brought about the conditions that led to 
the lawsuit." Id. at 22. 
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between the fresh start policy and the need to repay creditors and 
will consider whether the defalcation exception should be placed in 
either the type-based or fault-based category of exceptions. It will 
then interpret "defalcation" within the context of the § 523(a)(4) 
exception, analyze why a requirement of intent is appropriate in 
light of bankruptcy law's fresh start policy, and continue with a dis­
cussion of intent to do the act as opposed to intending the conse­
quences of that act. The analysis will conclude with a suggestion of 
which type of intent to apply to the defalcation exception. 
A. Balancing Act 
In interpreting § 523(a)(4), courts must reconcile the fresh start 
policy with the notion that some particular debts should not be dis­
charged. While the Bankruptcy Code originally allowed discharge 
for all provable debts,176 Congress has tempered this initial leniency 
by extending over time the list of debts that cannot be dis­
charged.177 While the premier purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is 
to provide certain debtors with "a new opportunity ... unhampered 
by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt,"178 this 
fresh start is available only to honest debtors. A delicate balance 
exists between the needs of the debtor and the creditor,179 but if 
176. Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 331 (1934). See also Williams 
v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 556 (1915) ("[P]rovable debts include 
all liabilities of the bankrupt founded on contract, express or implied, which, at the time 
of the bankruptcy, were fixed in amount or susceptible of liquidation."). 
177. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2004). See also Susan Elaine Sieger, et aI., Survey: 
Fraud As An Impediment To Discharge-Denial of Discharge And Exceptions To Dis­
charge Under the Bankruptcy Code, 3 J. BANKR. L & PRAC. 469, 494 (1994) (citing 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 17a(2), 30 Stat. 544, 550) ("The 1898 Act excepted from dis­
charge only those 'liabilities for obtaining property by false pretenses or false 
representations.' "). 
178. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (citing Williams, 236 U.S. 
at 554-55) (stating that "the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act [is] to convert the assets of 
the bankrupt into cash for distribution among creditors, and then to relieve the honest 
debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free 
from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes"). See 
also Summers, supra note 12, at 314 (articulating the two bankruptcy policies as the 
fresh start policy and repayment to similarly situated creditors); Hallinan, supra note 
52, at 51 (noting that the Supreme Court often decides bankruptcy issues on the basis of 
the fresh start policy) (citing Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (seeking to give the 
debtor a "new opportunity") and Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 244 (stating that the "purpose 
of the act ... is a new opportunity in life"»; supra note 74 and accompanying text 
(legislative history indicates that the fresh start policy is the first objective of bank­
ruptcy law and repayment to creditors is the second). 
179. Gross, supra note 50, at 60 ("[B]ankruptcy legislation reflects a longstanding 
struggle to reconcile the debtor's ability to retain future earnings with her creditors' 
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debtors happen upon honest failure, the Bankruptcy Code must 
construe their actions in the broadest sense to provide them with a 
fresh start while also properly deterring the debtors from acting 
dishonestly.18o 
B. 	 Categorizing § 523(a)(4) as a Type-Based or Fault-Based 
Exception 
As stated earlier, § 523(a) exceptions to discharge generally 
fall into one of two categories: type-based and fault-based.181 Con­
gress created exceptions in these two categories to balance the need 
to maintain debtor liability for certain debts against the policy al­
lowing honest debtors to discharge their debts and start afresh. To 
find whether intent is necessary to constitute defalcation, it is help­
ful to determine in which category § 523(a)(4) belongs. 
Type-based exceptions to discharge do not require proof of 
debtor's wrongful intent and cannot be discharged, even if incurred 
by an honest debtor.182 Debts that may not be discharged because 
of their type include those for a tax or customs duty,183 child s'up­
portor alimony,184 a fine or penaity,185 an educational loan or bene­
fit,186 death or personal injury caused by a debtor's driving while 
intoxicated,187 any payment of an order of restitution,188 a condo­
minium ownership fee,189 or court fees.190 These exceptions do not 
legitimate desires to maximize their recoveries ...." ). See also infra note 182 and 
accompanying text; Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991) ("Requiring the credi­
tor to establish" that the debtor committed fraud "by a preponderance of the evi­
dence," rather than by clear and convincing evidence, "reflects a fair balance between 
these conflicting interests. "). 
180. See In re Spar, 176 B.R. 321, 326 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that an 
equally important policy consideration is to "prevent the dishonest 'debtor's attempts 
to use the law's protections to shield his or her wrongdoing"') (quoting Matter of New­
ark, 20 B.R. 842, 852 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982». 
181. In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2002) (articulating that type-based debts 
are not discharged because forgiveness of a certain type of debt would not further a 
social policy and fault-based debts are not discharged because the debt resulted from 
some immoral or dishonest act done by the debtor). 
182. 	 Id. 
183. 	 11 U.S.c. §§ 523(a)(1)(A) and (B) (2004). 
184. § 523(a)(5). See also § 523(a)(15) (debts incurred in the course of a divorce 
or separation will not be discharged). 
185. 	 § 523(a)(7). 
186. 	 § 523(a)(8). 
187. § 523(a)(9). But see Baylis, 313 F.3d at 19 (labeling this exception as a fault-
based debt with fault being inferred from voluntary intoxication). 
188. 	 § 523(a)(13). 
189. 	 § 523(a)(16). 
190. 	 § 523(a)(17). 
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include, either through implication or expressly, words indicating 
that the debtor must possess some level of intent, but instead stand 
on their own as a matter of law. 
Other § 523(a) exceptions do contain words that look to the 
conduct of the debtor. These fault-based exceptions include debts 
for property obtained by false pretenses, by actual fraud191 or by 
use of a written statement that is materially false and that the 
debtor made with intent to deceive,192 debts involving willful and 
malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property 
of another entity,193 and malicious or reckless failure of the debtor 
to fulfill any commitment to a Federal depository institution's regu­
latory agency to maintain the capital of an insured depository 
institution.194 
The § 523(a)(4) defalcation exception can be viewed as type­
based, holding fiduciaries liable for debts that occur while he or she 
acts in his or her special legal role.195 While this view is arguable, 
even cases that tout the defalcation exception as type-based involve 
some wrongdoing on behalf of the fiduciary.196 The exception is 
fault-based if it requires dishonesty or wrongdoing on behalf of the 
fiduciary. Section 523(a)( 4) is probably more like fault-based ex­
ceptions, in that it contains language that suggests dishonesty on the 
part of the debtor.197 If one has committed fraud while acting in a 
fiduciary capacity (interpreted by Neal v. Clark to be actual 
fraud)198 then the fiduciary has committed a dishonest act with the 
intention to do so. Likewise, if one commits embezzlement199 or 
191. § 523(a)(2)(A). 
192. § 523(a)(2)(B). 
193. § 523(a)(6). 
194. § 523( a )(12). 
195. In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 2001); In re Cochrane, 124 F.3d 
978, 984 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Lewis, 97 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 1996). See also In re 
Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2002). According to the Baylis court: 
It is arguable that defalcation by a fiduciary fits into this 'type of debt' cate­
gory-that is, that Congress intended to reinforce the high standard of care 
owed by fiduciaries by making debts for defalcation non-dischargeable. That 
reading is, we think, an unlikely one, and we see no strong federal interest in 
making every debt from breach of a fiduciary duty non-dischargeable. 
Id. 
196. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
197. See supra note 140 (the Eighth Circuit states that fraud, embezzlement and 
larceny, also included in § 523(a)(4), are "solely intentional wrongs" while defalcation 
"include[s] innocent misdeeds"). 
198. Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877). 
199. See supra note 91; In re Belfry, 862 F.2d 661, 662 (8th Cir. 1988) (asserting 
that for the purposes of § 523(a)(4), embezzlement "is the fraudulent appropriation of 
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larceny,200 then intent is inferred, since the debtor dishonestly ap­
propriated entrusted funds. It is inconsistent to arbitrarily place the 
word "defalcation," which can be read to include innocent misallo­
cations or more deliberate defaults,201 among these fault-based ex­
ceptions if it were not to be read as requiring some sort of intent on 
behalf of the debtor .202 To determine which view is more appropri­
ate, it is necessary to look at the meaning of defalcation. 
C. Deciphering Defalcation 
Due to the scarcity of legislative history203 regarding how Con­
gress intended the courts to interpret the § 523(a)(4) meaning of 
defalcation, we are forced to look elsewhere for an appropriate 
meaning.204 We may look to the wording of the statute, including 
use and positioning of words, as well as how they have changed 
over the history of the Code;205 the way in which interpretation of 
the term coincides with the intended purposes of the Code,z06 and; 
the methods the various circuit courts have used in defining the 
term. 
property of another by a person to whom such property has been entrusted or into 
whose hands it has lawfully come"). See also 3 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW, supra note 
52, at § 47:47 ("The elements of embezzlement under Code § 523(a)(4) are: (1) appro· 
priation of funds by the debtor; (2) for the debtor's use or benefit; (3) done with fraudu­
lent intent. "). 
200. See infra note 228 and accompanying text. See also 3 NORTON BANKRUPTCY 
LAW, supra note 52, at § 47:47 (stating that the elements of larceny under common law 
are: "a finding that the debtor wrongfully, and with fraudulent intent, took the property 
of another"). 
201. In re Martin, 161 B.R. 672, 677 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. (Cal.) 1993) ("The primary 
difficulty is that definitions vary on whether defalcation includes some element of cul­
pable conduct ...."). 
202. Id. at 678. See also infra note 238 and accompanying text. 
203. Reinhardt & Horlbeck, supra note 8, at 1774. 
204. Ardenstani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135 (1991); Rubin v. U.S., 449 U.S. 424, 430 
(1981) (explaining when a statute's language is ambiguous, we may look not only to the 
language of the statute to determine its intended meaning, but also to the expressed 
intent of the legislature). 
205. Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 708 (1877). In interpreting fraud, the Supreme 
Court looked to the "familiar rule in the interpretation of written instruments and stat­
utes that 'a passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes and 
follows it.' So, also, 'the meaning of a word may be ascertained by reference to the 
meaning of words associated with it.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
206. K-mart v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) ("In ascertaining the plain 
meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, 
as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole."). See also U.S. v. Bois­
dore's Heirs, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850) ("In expounding a statute, we must not 
be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of 
the whole law, and to its object and policy."). 
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As noted above, "defalcation" has been defined by standard 
dictionaries in a variety of ways ranging from "the failure to meet 
an obligation" to "misappropriation of trust funds [by a fiduci­
ary]."207 In the mid-1800s, which is the time of the word's origin in 
bankruptcy law, defalcation meant either "the reduction of a claim 
of one of the contracting parties against the other, by deducting 
from it a smaller claim due from the former to the latter" or "the 
act of a defaulter."208 It is not clear whether Congress wanted a 
narrower or broader reading of the word. 
In interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, courts have continued to 
fill in gaps left, whether intentionally or otherwise, by Congress. In 
1878, the Supreme Court made a crucial decision in determining 
how "fraud" should be read in the section of the 1867 Bankruptcy 
Act that is analogous to today's § 523(a)(4).209 In Neal v. Clark, the 
Supreme Court determined that fraud, which could mean "actual 
fraud ... implied or constructive fraud, or gross negligence, which 
may be equivalent to fraud," meant positive fraud involving "moral 
turpitude" or bad faith.210 The Court noted that "[a] different con­
struction would be inconsistent with the liberal spirit which per­
vades the entire bankrupt[cy] system."211 Similarly, in 1844 the 
Supreme Court reasoned that "fiduciary" should be read more nar­
rowly within bankruptcy law to include only those fiduciary duties 
created by express trustS.212 Therefore, in § 523(a)(4), fiduciary ex­
207. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text for definitions of defalcation. 
See also In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d 806, 811 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing BLACK'S LAW DIC· 
TIONARY 427 (7th ed. 1999» (defining "defalcation"). But see In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 
18 n.4 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing A DICTIONARY OF MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 191 (B. 
Garner ed., 1998)) ("[S]ome writers have misused defalcation while referring to a non­
fraudulent default ...."). 
208. A LAW DICTIONARY BY JOHN BOUVIER (6th ed. 1856) (citing the Bank­
ruptcy Act of 1841), available at http://www.constitution.org/bouvlbouviecd.htm (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2005). 
209. Neal, 95 U.S. at 707. See also An Act to Establish a Uniform System of 
Bankruptcy Throughout the United States, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, 533 (1867) (codified at 
Title CXI Rev. Stat. § 5117 (1878) (repealed 1878)) ("No debt created by the fraud or 
embezzlement of the bankrupt, or by his defalcation as a public officer, or while acting 
in any fiduciary character, shall be discharged under this act."). Cf 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) 
(2004) (noting that the legislative history comments state that "subparagraph (A) of 
523(a)(2)(A) is intended to codify current case law, e.g., Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704 
(1887), which interprets 'fraud' to mean actual or positive fraud rather than fraud im­
plied in law"). 
210. Neal, 95 U.S. at 707-08. 
211. Id. at 709. 
212. Chapman v. Forsyth, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 202 (1844) (interpreting "fiduciary" 
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1841). See also Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 
328, 393 (1934) (further limiting "fiduciary" to include only those debts created prior to 
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cludes many traditional dictionary definitions of the word.213 These 
Supreme Court interpretations show that a term may not always be 
defined by its traditional meaning and may be narrowed to suit the 
"liberal spirit" of the Bankruptcy Code.214 While many courts have 
read defalcation in its traditional broad sense, there is reason to 
question whether this approach is consistent with bankruptcy policy 
and if "defalcation" should have a narrower meaning within 
§ 523(a)(4). 
The word "defalcation" appeared initially in the Bankruptcy 
Code in 1841 and has remained to the modern day, although its 
positioning in text has changed.2Is In Neal v. Clark, the Supreme 
Court, in interpreting the meaning of fraud within the Bankruptcy 
Act, used the maxim that "the coupling of words together shows 
that they are to be understood in the same sense."216 It also ac­
knowledged that if the meaning of a statute is unclear, the intent of 
the drafters may be ascertained by looking at neighboring words.217 
the wrong). But see Baylis, 313 F.3d at 13 (stating that the notion that "fiduciary capac­
ity" relates only to express trusts is no longer clear). 
213. Kahl & Ismay, supra note 79, at 121 (stating that the traditional meaning of 
fiduciary, a confidence or trust, is too broad a definition within the bankruptcy context; 
commercial relationships, such as those of agents, bailees, brokers, factors and partners, 
are not contemplated by this section of the Code). 
214. Neal, 95 U.S. at 709. 
215. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 511 (2d Cir. 1937). 
See also Flaccus, supra note 84, at 231. The 1841 statute provided that: 
[a]1I persons whatsoever, residing in any State, District or Territory of the 
United States, owing debts, which shall not have been created in consequence 
of a defalcation as a public officer; or as executor, administrator, guardian or 
trustee, or while acting in any other fiduciary capacity, who shall, by peti­
tion ... apply to the proper court ... shall be deemed bankrupts within the 
purview of this act . . .. 
An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United States, 
ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, 441 (1841) (repealed 1843). 
The 1867 statute said, "no debt created by the fraud or embezzlement of the bank­
rupt, or by his defalcation as a public officer, or while acting in any fiduciary character, 
shall be discharged under this act ...." An Act to Establish a Uniform System of 
Bankruptcy Throughout the United States, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, 533 (1867) (codified at 
Title LXI Rev. Stat. § 5117 (1878) (repealed 1878». 
The 1898 act said, "[a] discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of 
his provable debts, except such as ... (4) were created by his fraud, embezzlement, 
misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity." 
An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United States, 
ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 550-51 (codified at 11 U.S.c. § 17(a)(4) (1898) (repealed 1979)). 
Finally, the current Code says, "[a] discharge ... does not discharge an individual 
debtor from any debt ... (4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capac­
ity, embezzlement or larceny." 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(4) (2003). 
216. Neal, 95 U.S. at 708-09. 
217. Id. at 708 ("It is a familiar rule in the interpretation of written instruments 
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At that time, "fraud" was coupled with the term "embezzle­
ment."218 The Court reasoned that since "embezzlement" involved 
an intentional wrong219 and "fraud" was in direct association with 
the term, then Congress must have intended "fraud" to mean actual 
or positive fraud in this exception, even though it could have meant 
implied fraud.220 
Applying such reasoning to elucidate the 1898 Act, one could 
presume that in choosing the placement of the words "fraud, em­
bezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation," Congress meant 
each to encompass some level of intent.221 The 1898 phraseology 
was repealed in 1979 and replaced with the current structure plac­
ing "fraud" and "defalcation" in direct association with one another 
and modifying both these words with "while acting in a fiduciary 
capacity."222 Courts have construed this arrangement to mean that 
"while acting in a fiduciary capacity" limits only "fraud" and "defal­
cation," while "embezzlement" and the newly added "larceny" 
have a much broader scope and include non-fiduciaries.223 Not 
only was the positioning of these terms altered in 1979, but "misap­
propriation" was eliminated and "larceny" was added.224 It is inter­
esting to note that "misappropriation," which was interpreted by 
and statutes that 'a passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes 
and follows it. "') (citation omitted). 
218. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
219. See In re Belfry, 862 F.2d 661, 662 (8th Cir. 1988) ) (quoting In re Shultz, 46 
B.R. 880, 889 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985» (restating that for the purposes of § 523(a)(4), 
embezzlement "is the fraudulent appropriation of property of another by a person to 
whom such property has been entrusted or into whose hands it has lawfully come."). 
220. Neal, 95 U.S. at 709 (stating that this reading was justified if not required and 
"[s]uch a construction of the statute is consonant with equity, and consistent with the 
object and intention of Congress in enacting a general law by which the honest citizen 
may be relieved from the burden of hopeless insolvency"). 
221. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. The 1898 act said, "[a] discharge 
in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as ... 
(4) were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while 
acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity." An Act to Establish a Uniform System 
of Bankruptcy Throughout the United States, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 550-51 (codified at 
11 U.S.c. § 17(a)(4) (1898) (repealed 1979». 
222. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. See also 11 U.S.c. § 523(a) 
(2000) (noting the legislative statements in S. REP. No. 95-989, at 79 (1978) discussed 
that § 523(a)(4) "excepts debts for fraud incurred by the debtor while acting in a fiduci­
ary capacity or for defalcation, embezzlement, or misappropriation"). 
223. See In re Graziano, 35 B.R. 589, 594 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) questioned by 
In re Goux, 72 B.R. 355 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Carlton, 26 B.R. 202, 205 
(Bankr. Tenn. 1982). 
224. See supra note 215. See also Graziano, 35 B.R. at 593 (stating that the addi­
tion of the word larceny along with rearrangement of the phrase "while acting in a 
fiduciary capacity" constitute "significant revision[ s 1"). 
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the Fifth Circuit to require no intent,225 was dropped and replaced 
by "larceny," defined as "the fraudulent and wrongful taking and 
carrying away the property of another with intent to convert such 
property to the taker's use without the consent of the owner."226 
The modification of "fraud" and "defalcation" with "while act­
ing in a fiduciary capacity" can be interpreted in a variety of ways. 
"Fraud" may require intent while "defalcation" requires none (this 
conclusion can be drawn from the argument that, Congress would 
not have added both words where one would be sufficient227); 
"fraud" and "defalcation" may take on the same level of intent, or; 
"fraud" and "defalcation" may each require some intent but the 
level of intent may be different for each. Taking cues from the Su­
preme Court in Neal v. Clark as to how the Bankruptcy Code 
should be interpreted,228 "fraud" and "defalcation" are like terms 
that should be read together and thus, both should require intent.229 
Since Neal v. Clark held that both "fraud" and "embezzlement" in 
the 1898 Act required an intentional wrong on the part of the 
debtor, it follows that "defalcation," which is in direct association 
with "fraud" in the Bankruptcy Code, would also require an inten­
tional wrong.230 Such an interpretation is in accordance with the 
225. Carey Lumber Co. v. Bell, 615 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 1980). But see In re 
Brown, 4 B.R. 539, 544 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980) ("To find a 'misappropriation' as that 
term is used in § 17a( 4) of the Bankruptcy Act, there must be a taking, the taking must 
be intentional, and it must be improper or unlawful."). 
226. Graziano, 35 B.R. at 594 (also noting that larceny and embezzlement differ 
only in the manner with which the debtor takes possession of the funds). 
227. Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2286 (2004) ("A statute should be construed 
so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superflu­
ous, void or insignificant ....") (citation omitted). 
228. 11 U.S.c. § 523(a) (2000) (quoting N. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, (rev. 6th ed. 2000» (stating subparagraph (A) [of 
§ 523(a)(2)(A)] is intended to codify current case law, e.g. Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704 
(1887) [24 L.Ed. 586], which interprets 'fraud' to mean actual or positive fraud rather 
than fraud implied in law). 
229. Neal, 95 U.S. at 709. See also FJaccus, supra note 84, at 229-30. Flaccus 
states that 
if fraud means moral turpitude or intentional wrongdoing, this could influence 
the interpretation of the word 'defalcation' with which 'fraud' is coupled in the 
statutory language. The argument could be made that defalcation, too, should 
mean some type of wrongdoing, that putting intentional lies along with inno­
cent defalcations without covering some type of intermediary misconduct 
seems odd. 
Id. See also Singer, supra note 60, at 368 ("The fraud [in the context of §523( a)( 4) 1must 
involve a moral turpitude or intentional wrong; fraud implied in law, or constructive 
fraud, which may exist without the imputation of immorality or bad faith, is 
insufficient."). 
230. Neal, 95 U.S. at 709. 
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fresh start policy. 
The Ninth Circuit in In re Martin 231 raised a similar argument. 
That court stated that it would be inconsistent to read defalcation as 
not requiring any intent, when every other act in § 523(a)(4) re­
quires "some element of bad faith."232 Following Neal v. Clark's 
logic that like words are grouped together, this court said that "de­
falcation" must involve bad faith of a sort, since it is included in the 
same section as "fraud," "embezzlement," and "larceny."233 Since 
it would be redundant to include terms with the same level of in­
tent,234 the Court resolved that defalcation requires intent but at a 
lesser level than fraud. 
D. Requiring Intent: In Accordance With Fresh Start Policy 
A requirement of intent gives § 523(a)(4) a narrow construc­
tion, which is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code's fresh start pol­
icy.235 In deference to this policy, the Supreme Court provided 
lower courts with a general rule of liberal construction favoring the 
debtor and has suggested that limits to discharge under § 523 
"should be construed narrowly so as to assure that the basic policy 
of giving the honest debtor a fresh start is not frustrated. "236 The 
Court also stated that exceptions "should not be read more broadly 
231. In re Martin, 161 B.R. 672, 678 (B.A.P 9th Cir. 1993), overruled by In re 
Lewis, 97 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1996). 
232. Martin, 161 B.R. at 678. See also supra note 140 (stating that fraud, embez­
zlement and larceny, also included in § 523(a)(4), are "solely intentional wrongs," while 
defalcation "include[s] innocent ... misdeeds"). 
233. Neal, 95 U.S. at 709. See also infra section III.B (categorizing § 523(a)(4) as 
a Type-Based or Fault-Based Exception). This is also consistent with the notion that 
entire exceptions, rather than parts of them, may be divided into categories of type­
based and fault-based debt. Reading defalcation to require no intent would fit it into 
the type-based category while fraud, embezzlement and larceny would all fit into the 
fault-based category. Such a reading would make the § 523(a)(4) exception vastly dif­
ferent from all other § 523(a) exceptions. 
234. Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S.Ct. 2276, 2286 (2004). 
235. See supra infra section I.B (A Fresh Start for Honest Debtors). See also Hal­
linan, supra note 52, at 51 (arguing that the fresh start policy is not only an objective but 
perhaps the sole principle of bankruptcy law). See also supra note 74, at 50-51 (the fresh 
start policy is the first objective of bankruptcy law). 
236. Martin, 161 B.R. at 678 (citing Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915)). 
See also Neal, 95 U.S. at 709 (determining that its decision to construe "fraud" as re­
quiring moral turpitude was "consonant with equity, and consistent with the object and 
intention of Congress in enacting a general law by which the honest citizen may be 
relieved from the burden of hopeless insolvency," and further that "[a] different con­
struction would be inconsistent with the liberal spirit which pervades the entire bank­
rupt system"). 
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than necessary to effectuate policy."237 To remain consistent with 
such precedent, it is reasonable to conclude that defalcation should 
require some level of intent on the part of a fiduciary debtor. 
A fresh start benefits the debtor, by providing freedom from 
debt and collection efforts, and the public, by allowing the debtor to 
become a productive member of society once again.238 It also fur­
thers the original goal of bankruptcy law, that of promoting coril­
merce.239 Embarking on a business endeavor or taking on the 
responsibility of a fiduciary is risky. Providing discharge as a relief 
reduces this risk, thereby giving individuals an incentive, or at least 
a safeguard, for their commercial efforts and also providing a fresh 
start for those who wish to make a second attempt after unintended 
failure.24o Since it "is impossible to identify in advance 'which indi­
viduals will conceive the best ideas'" that will ultimately benefit so­
ciety, the relief provided by bankruptcy must be afforded to all 
individuals.241 There remains the possibility that an "honest but un­
fortunate" professional or entrepreneur could commit a defalcation 
while acting in a fiduciary capacity by making an innocent de­
fault.242 Therefore, requiring some level of intent for defalcation is 
a proper construction that would not frustrate bankruptcy's primary 
objective, to promote the fresh start pOlicy.243 
237. Martin, 161 B.R. at 678. 
238. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1933) (noting the "purpose of the 
act [to provide a fresh start] has been again and again emphasized by the courts as being 
of public as well as private interest"). 
239. Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 26, at 327 (stating that 
originally bankruptcy protected creditors, "protecting creditors protected commerce, 
and commerce was king"). 
240. Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 244; Hallinan, supra note 52, at 63 (stating the "pro­
ductivity rationale itself was rooted in the established conception of financial failure as 
an unavoidable consequence of entrepreneurial risk taking"). 
241. See John M. Czarnetzy, The Individual and Failure: A Theory of The Bank­
ruptcy Discharge, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 393, 405 (2000) (for a complete discussion of the 
entrepreneurial theory behind discharge). 
242. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510, 511 (2d Cir. 1937) 
(suggesting that an innocent default may constitute defalcation). See also Czarnetzky, 
supra note 241, at 412 (suggesting that the entrepreneur who undertakes a business risk 
that results in failure is such an "'honest, but unfortunate' debtor[ ]"). 
243. See supra note 235 and accompanying text; see also notes 64 and 74 and 
accompanying legislative history discussing the importance of the fresh start policy. See 
also Hallinan, supra note 52, at 54 (asserting that the fresh start "was originally con­
ceived not as a relief measure but as a reward for the debtor's efforts to maximize the 
return to his creditors"; therefore, this liberal construction favoring the debtor and dis­
charge may also provide the debtor with incentive to initiate bankruptcy proceedings 
that in tum, promotes the second policy of bankruptcy law-repayment to creditors). 
127 2005] THE DEFALCATION EXCEPTION TO DISCHARGE 
E. Intent To Do The Act 
Reading the § 523(a)(4) defalcation exception as requiring in­
tent on the part of the debtor is consistent with the policies of the 
Bankruptcy Code and with statutory interpretation used by the Su­
preme Court in interpreting the Bankruptcy Code. However, it is 
not clear whether this means that the debtor must simply intend to 
commit the act, which itself triggers defalcation, or whether he or 
she must intend to produce the outcome that results from the act.244 
Section 523(a)(6) of Title 11, an exception for willful (meaning 
deliberate and more than merely reckless)245 and malicious246 in­
jury to an entity or its property, articulates an exemption to dis­
charge for those who willfully cause injury. It would be redundant 
for defalcation to require a similar mental state.247 In Kawaauhau 
v. Geiger, the Supreme Court determined that the § 523(a)(6) ex­
ception for "willful and malicious injury" requires the debtor to "in­
tend the [actual] consequences of an act, not simply the act 
itself."248 Therefore, § 523(a)(6) does not cover instances in which 
the act is intended, but the resulting injury is not the desired out­
come of the debtor,249 nor does it encompass debts arising from 
recklessly or negligently inflicted injuries.250 As a result of the Su­
preme Court decision in Kawaauhau v. Geiger, a creditor would 
have to show that the debtor intended to cause the injury, not only 
to do the act causing the injury, in order to deny discharge of a debt 
244. In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Specific intent requires that the 
accused have the intent to accomplish the precise criminal act with which he is 
charged."). 
245. Singer, supra note 60, at 376-77. 
246. Id. at 377 (stating the element of maliciousness "requires a heightened level 
of culpability which transcends mere willfulness" but does not require spite or ill will). 
247. Baylis, 313 F.3d at 17. See BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 4:36 (5th ed. 2003) 
("In order to avoid redundancy within Section 523(a), defalcation must mean some­
thing ... different from willful and malicious injury because that is covered by Section 
523(a)(6)."). See also In re Martin, 161 B.R. 672, 680 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that inten­
tional tortious conduct would be unnecessary for § 523(a)(4) "in light of the broad defi­
nition of willful and malicious conduct applied under [§ 523(a)(6)]"). 
248. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 57-58 (1998) (finding that "a debt arising 
from a medical malpractice judgment attributable to negligent or reckless conduct" 
does not fall within the § 523(a)(6) exception). 
249. Id. at 62 (noting that a broader reading of the exception "would be incom­
patible with the 'well known' guide that exceptions to discharge 'should be confined to 
those plainly expressed' "). 
250. Id. at 64; 6 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 12, The New "Intentional Tort" 
Standard Under Section 523(a)(6) (1998). This holding adjusted one of the common 
uses of § 523(a)(6) by creditors who argued that discharge should not be granted to the 
debtor who converted the creditor's property without its consent. 
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under § 523(a)(6).251 
In In re Johnson, which used an objective standard to decide if 
a debtor has committed defalcation,252 the Sixth Circuit stated that 
"mere negligence or a mistake of fact" was not sufficient to consti­
tute a defalcation, but also refused to require a specific motive or 
wrongful intent.253 One can resolve the seemingly contradictory 
parts of the opinion by interpreting it as saying that a debtor does 
not need to intend the consequences of his or her actions, but that 
the act that brings about the consequences was intentional and did 
not occur by mistake. Since willful and malicious intent to injure 
property is covered by section § 523(a)(6), it is fitting to read 
§ 523(a)(4) as requiring intent on the part of the debtor to do the 
act, but not necessarily to intend the consequences of that act.254 
Let us revisit the introduction's hypotheticaF55 while using the 
standard that the defalcation exception requires an intent to do the 
act, but not intent to cause the deleterious outcome. The trustee 
described in the above hypothetical situation who placed funds in a 
bank that misrepresents itself as federally insured did not intend to 
place the funds in a non-federally insured bank, nor did he intend 
that the bank go belly-up. Therefore, this fiduciary made a mistake, 
but did not commit a defalcation. The trustee who placed funds in 
a non-insured bank that did not advertise itself as insured is a bit 
trickier. The court would need to determine whether the trustee 
intended to place the funds in a bank that was not insured; if he did, 
even though he did not intend the bank to go bankrupt, he could 
still be liable for defalcation. However, if he was merely negligent 
in placing the funds in a non-insured bank, it would be consistent 
with the Bankruptcy Code to allow him a discharge of the debt and 
a fresh start. In opposite, the trustee who intended to invest trust 
funds in his own company as a temporary loan, against the owner's 
instructions to secure the funds in a federally insured bank would 
be liable for defalcation if the funds were lost even though he did 
not intend to lose the funds. The last scenario given, where the 
trustee took the money and ran, would be considered fraud since he 
intended the act and the consequences of the act. 
Reading defalcation to require intent to do the inappropriate 
251. Kawaauhau, 523 u.s. at 64. 
252. In re Johnson, 691 F.2d 249, 255 (6th Cir. 1982). See also In re Baylis, 313 
F.3d at 17 ("Defalcation is to be measured objectively."). 
253. Johnson, 691 F.2d at 257. 
254. Id. at 256-57. 
255. See supra Introduction. 
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act rather than to intend the harmful consequences is also fitting in 
light of legislative history that exists with respect to amendments to 
§ 523(a)(4), which suggests that the exception is a compromise be­
tween the House bill and the Senate amendment.256 While misap­
propriation is no longer in the wording of § 523(a)(4) itself, 
legislative history states that this section is intended to "except[] 
debts for fraud incurred by the debtor while acting in a fiduciary 
capacity or for defalcation, embezzlement, or misappropriation."257 
The contemporaneous House Report indicates that § 523(a)(4) ex­
cepts debt for embezzlement or larceny and that "intent is to in­
clude . . . debts . . . which the debtor willfully and maliciously 
intends to borrow for a short period of time with no intent to inflict 
injury but on which injury is in fact inflicted."258 This statement 
also suggests that Congress anticipated some level of intent in doing 
the act to be required by § 523(a)(4),259 even if the specific injury is 
not intended. 
F. Which Level of Intent Should Be Applied? 
After determining that intent should be required on the part of 
the debtor committing the defalcation, it is proper to discuss which 
level of intent should be applied to § 523(a)(4). The court in In re 
Baylis suggested that the level of intent should be "closer to fraud, 
without ... meeting a strict specific intent requirement."26o In ar­
ticulating this standard, the First Circuit determined that where the 
fiduciary in question "used reasonable care" in his role as a co-trus­
tee, he was not liable for defalcation.261 It also found that the 
debtor, in using trust assets to pay for his own legal defense, acted 
256. 8 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE 2D, 11 U.S.C. § 523 Debtor's Du­
ties and Benefits (2003). The Editor's Comments state that § 523(a)(4) is a compromise 
between HR 8200 and S 2266. S 2266 excepted "fraud while acting in a fiduciary capac­
ity, defalcation, embezzlement or misappropriation." However, an earlier version of S 
2266 was similar to HR 8200, and only referred to embezzlement or misappropriation. 
257. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 79 (1978). See also 11 U.S.c. § 523(a) (2000) (noting 
also that the placement of "fiduciary capacity" differs from that of the actual text of the 
statute). 
258. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 364 (1977). 
259. This also supports the idea that § 523(a)(4) is a fault-based exception. 
260. In re Baylis, 313 F.3d 9, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2002). 
261. Id. at 22. The court determined that the debtor, acting as a co-trustee, was 
obligated "to use reasonable care to prevent a co-trustee from committing a breach of 
the trust." Id. However, it also stated that "'[r]easonableness,' ... is not the test for 
whether a breach is a defalcation, but if the trustee acted reasonably, there is no defal­
cation." Id. See also id. at 23 (stating that the debtor's judgments in dealing with his co­
trustee "were flawed and clearly negligent, but not so reckless as to rise to the level of 
fault needed to constitute defalcation"). 
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with "extreme[] reckless[ness] ... in light of his duty of loyalty," 
thus making him liable for defalcation.262 In Moreno,263 Bennett,264 
and Schwager,265 the Fifth Circuit defined defalcation as a "willful 
neglect of duty, even if not accompanied by fraud or embezzle­
ment,"266 and said the "willful neglect" standard was "a standard of 
recklessness."267 
A "willful neglect" standard is consistent with the fresh start 
policy. Reading "defalcation" in a narrow sense, it requires more 
than mere negligence or mistake. It is consistent with Central Han­
over, in that a willful neglect standard would require less intent 
than fraud, which requires actual intent.268 Since actual intent re­
quires the actor to intend the consequences of his actions, this will­
ful neglect standard is also consistent with the notion that 
defalcation requires only intent to commit the act itself and not to 
intend the outcome.269 It is consistent with the facts of the defalca­
tion cases where the court said that mere negligence or mistake is 
sufficient because, even in those cases, "there is generally some ap­
pearance of wrongdoing within the facts of each such case."270 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the fresh start policy, requiring an interpretation 
favoring the debtor, exceptions for discharge should be construed 
narrowly so as not to frustrate this primary objective of bankruptcy 
law. A rule that mere negligence or mistake may constitute a defal­
cation while acting in a fiduciary capacity would contrast with this 
ideal. Therefore, it is appropriate to require a debtor acting in a 
fiduciary capacity to intend to commit a defalcation if his or her 
262. Id. at 22. 
263. In re Moreno, 892 F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 1990). 
264. In re Bennett, 989 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1993). 
265. Id. at 184 (the debtor was the managing partner of a partnership that 
stopped making payments on a note after financing its purchase of property with a 
loan). 
266. Id. at 790. 
267. Id. at 185. See also In re Gaubert, 149 B.R. 819, 827 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1992) 
(stating that the definition of "willful neglect" is not clear but has been stated to "im­
pose a standard of recklessness" or is "understood to refer to conduct that is not merely 
negligent"). 
268. See Schwager, 121 F.3d at 185 (citing Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust v. Herbst, 
93 F.2d 510, 512 (2d Cir. 1937» (stating that defalcation requires a lesser standard than 
fraud). See also BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1996) (defining intent as "a state 
of mind wherein the person knows and desires the consequences of one's own act"). 
269. See supra discussion in lILE (Intent to do the Act). 
270. In re Martin, 161 B.R. at 677. 
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debt will be denied discharge per § 523(a)(4). However, this re­
quirement of intent should apply only to the act bringing about the 
consequence, rather than to the consequence itself, thus making the 
exception distinguishable from the § 523(a)(6) exception for willful 
or malicious injury to property. In conclusion, the "willful neglect" 
standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit most appropriately complies 
with bankruptcy's policy of providing a "fresh start to the honest 
debtor" while distinguishing the § 523(a)(4) exception from 
§ 523(a)(6) and should be adopted as the standard of intent re­
quired for "defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity." 
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